In 1926 Lemkin obtained a Doctorate in Law from the University of Lwów. Szawłowski has noted that doctoral degrees in law in Austria-Hungary (hence also at the universities of Cracow and Lwów) could only be obtained by passing some advanced examinations (so-called rigorosa), without presenting a doctoral thesis. Lemkin also studied in Germany, France and Italy, although it is not known for how long.
13 By the 1930s Lemkin was known internationally as a scholar in international criminal law, participating in and contributing to conferences across Europe, notably conferences in Paris (1931) , Madrid (1933) , Budapest, Copenhagen (1935) , Hague (1937) , Paris (1937) , Amsterdam and Cairo. 14 For the 1933 Madrid conference, Lemkin prepared a draft report, which suggested outlawing the acts of "barbarism" and "vandalism" by identifying them as international crimes. He later used this as a basis for his proposal to outlaw genocide, made in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. 15 Lemkin had received information that, as a consequence of efforts of the anti-Semitic newspaper Gazeta Warszawska, the Polish Minister of Justice was opposed to him attending the Madrid conference.
From the official documents of the Madrid conference it seems that Lemkin was not personally present at the conference, which may explain why his report was dropped. 17 The crime of barbarity consisted of "destroying a national or religious collectivity" and the crime of vandalism consisted of "destroying works of culture, which represented the specific genius of these national and religious groups". Lemkin wanted to preserve both the physical existence and the spiritual life of these collectivities. 18 The proposal on outlawing "barbarism" and "vandalism" were of relevance for genocide because of their focus on group protection. 19 The basic idea of the proposal, as Lemkin subsequently formulated, was that "an international treaty should be negotiated declaring that attacks upon national, religious and ethnic groups should be made international crimes, and that perpetrators of such crimes should not only be liable for trial in their own countries but, in the event of escape, could also be tried in the place of refuge, or else extradited to a the country where the crime was committed." 20 This proposal was developed further in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: genocide should be prohibited in war and peace and universal repression of genocide should be included in an international multilateral treaty as well as in domestic criminal codes. 21 Lemkin was as concerned with the loss of culture as with the loss of life. He argued that mass murder should not be confused with genocide, stating that, "mass-murder or extermination do not convey the elements of selection and do not indicate the losses in terms of culture represented by the nation's victims." 22 Lemkin thus fused the concepts of "barbarism" -physical and biological destruction of a group -and "vandalism" -the destruction of cultural works -into genocide. Lemkin tried to get cultural genocide into the Genocide Convention and while it was in the 1947 draft presented by the UN Secretariat, 23 it did not get support by the states and was subsequently excluded from the 1948 Genocide Convention. 24 While the current definition of genocide covers barbarism and as such physical and biological genocide, vandalism and protection of property is instead part of the law of international humanitarian law and a war crime. The 1954 Hague Convention was the first international convention to exclusively address the subject of cultural property.
25 Destruction of cultural property is a war crime under customary international law and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 26 In 1934 Lemkin was called to the Bar and started practicing law in Warsaw. The reason for entering into private practice has not been established. Lemkin's law office was first based on Jerozolimskie Avenue and then in an elegant new building on Kredytowa Street. 27 Lemkin's private practice is relevant for this study because it was in this capacity that he came in contact with Swedish companies operating in Poland, contacts which he used during his work in Stockholm as explained below.
In a lecture on Lemkin, Philippe Sands makes the personal reflection that Lemkin, together with international law scholars such as Louis Sohn (member of the United States delegation to the San Francisco Conference 1945, professor Harvard Law School), Hersch Lauterpacht (member Raphaël Lemkin in Stockholm -Significance for his Work on "Axis Rule in Occupied Europe" ©2019 Genocide Studies and Prevention 13, no. 1 https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.13.1.1623 67 of the ILC and ICJ judge) and Raphaël Lemkin, were either born in, had lived in or had parents from Lviv. 28 Lviv's role in international law might only be a coincidence. On the other hand the people of Lviv -of which many were Jews -had witnessed several catastrophic conflicts and were aware of the cultural differences in and around the Lemberg community as well as the threats to minorities. 29 Against this background Lviv's place in international law -human rights law and international criminal law in particular -becomes easier to rationalize. This study describes the period when Lemkin lived and worked in Stockholm focusing on four aspects; 1) Why Karl Schlyter -a prominent lawyer and politician -helped Lemkin to get a visa to Sweden. For that reason this study will discuss Schlyter's political views; 2) Lemkin Lemkin's flight from Poland started six days after the Wehrmachts invasion of Poland. He took a train to eastern Poland (Wołkowysk, now in Belarus), where his brother and parents lived. Thereafter, in October 1939, he headed to Kaunas and later Vilnius, Lithuania. In Lithuania, Lemkin stayed loyal to the idea that there had to be some kind of redress after the war. In a conversation with the criminologist Wroblewski, Lemkin stated that "[i]n all periods of transition … moral standards break down. This does not mean that we should accept it passively -we must try to set the standards up again." In another conversation Lemkin stated that "[k] illing an individual is a domestic crime -every nation deals with it through its courts and on its own initiative… But murder of a whole people must be recognized as an international crime, which should concern not just one nation but the entire world." According to his autobiography Lemkin refers to the fact that he sent three telegrams, two telegrams -pleas of refuge -to his friend and former Minister of Justice Karl Schlyter and to Count Carton de Wiart, president of the International Association of Criminal Law and former president of the League of Nations. He asked whether they could arrange for temporary entry into Sweden and Belgium. Lemkin had worked with them for many years at international conferences. He sent a third telegram to Pédones, a mother and daughter who owned a publishing house in Paris, to inquire whether they had received the manuscript of the book International Payments, later to be published by the same publishing house: La réglementation des paiements internationaux (1939) . He also wrote to Professor McDermott and it was clear already at this stage that he wanted to go the United States. 32 The manuscript was at the time Lemkin's only possession and he perceived it as a bridge to the future. It was published with great speed and Lemkin sent it to universities where he intended eventually to establish himself, including to Karl Schlyter in Sweden and Malcolm McDermott at Duke University. A month later Schlyter arranged for Lemkin to come to Sweden. 33 Lemkin's autobiography fails to mention correspondence that appears crucial for his escape from Lithuania to Sweden. In the archives one can read a letter from Lemkin to Hartvig Nissenthe director of the prison Botsfengslet (Oslo, Norway) and dated October 25, 1939 -where Lemkin asked for help getting a visa to Norway. Lemkin asked Nissen to query Schlyter for the same help if a visa to Norway was not possible. Lemkin explained that he only needed help with a visa as his tangible assets were adequate. 34 Nissen made some enquires and on November 7, 1939 answered Lemkin that it was difficult to get a visa to Norway, it was only possible if one was traveling to 28 Sands, Memory of Justice, 745. It just so happens that that my father's birthplace of Borislav is in Lviv oblast (region).
Thus I found it compelling to examine how Lemkin was -for a brief period -a lecturer at the department of Law in Stockholm -a second piece that we have in common. 29 Moses, Raphaël Lemkin, 23; Sands, Memory of Justice, 748. 30 Lemkin writes "Stockholm University" in his autobiography, see for example Lemkin, Totally Unofficial, 75. 31 On biographical studies as legal science, see Jan-Olof Sundell, Karl Schlyter -En Biografi (Norstedts Juridik AB, 1998), 12. 32 Lemkin, Totally Unofficial, 29, [62] [63] [64] 71. 33 Ibid., 155. 34 "Letter from Raphaël Lemkin to Hartvig Nissen," October 25, 1939, Centraldossier (Lemkin) " (1934) . Considering that it would have taken time to get a visa for Norway, Nissen turned to Schlyter and asked him for help. 36 Worth mention is that Nissen attended a lunch at Schlyter's home on December 1, 1939, 37 a few weeks after their correspondence concerning Lemkin. This suggests that Schlyter and Nissen had continuous contacts during this period. On November 11, 1939, Schlyter sent a letter with the correspondence from Lemkin and Nissen to the Director General of Socialstyrelsen (National board of Health and Welfare), using the letterhead of Scania and Blekinge Court of Appeal. He vouched for Lemkin, requested a visa for him and certified that the law journal Svensk Juristtidning (for which Schlyter was the chief editor) promised to stand as a guarantor (borgen) for Lemkin's living expenses for a period of six months. 38 This was important given that Sweden already in 1927 had started to raise barriers against immigration. Levine notes that throughout the 1930s Sweden was as restrictive, if not more so, than almost every other Western democracy in blocking the entry for Jews. This can be seen in contrast to Great Britain, which in 1939 allowed entry into the country of 40 000-50 000 refugees, Sweden tightening its restrictions even more following Kristallnacht. The only option for Jews subjected to the pressure of leaving Germany (and later Austria and annexed areas) was either to obtain an entry visa prior to departure, or hope to find a country willing at least to let them in awaiting onward transit. Sweden neither gave residency nor even transit to Jews in any significant numbers.
39 This is illustrated by the creation from October 5, 1938 of the German "J"-passport for Jews at the request of Sweden and Switzerland whereby Swedish and Swiss customs officials could more easily stop Jews from entering their countries. 40 By the end of 1938 Sweden had set a quota of 1,625 Jews to be allowed entry into the country, almost all with the condition that it was in transit. 41 Although Lemkin found faults in Sweden's foreign policy he admitted that he owed his life to Sweden's neutrality.
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In Lemkin's visa application dated January 3, 1940 it is stated that he was of Polish nationality 35 "Letter from Hartvig Nissen to Raphaël Lemkin," November 7, 1939, Centraldossier (Lemkin) , Riksarkivet (Swedish National Archives), translated by the author of this article. 36 "Letter from Hartvig Nissen to Karl Schlyter," November 8, 1939, Centraldossier (Lemkin) towards supporting Germany and that the Swedish upper class was Germanophilic, 57 in some cases even sympathetic to Nazism (as a bulwark against Communism but also because of racism).
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Sweden responded to the Nazi persecution of Jews in the 1930s as many other democratic nations did -with closed doors. However, there were many voices in Sweden, particularly within Social Democratic circles, that called upon their nation to reject as ungenerous the response to the Nazi policies of expulsion.
59
Schlyter and Lemkin had collaborated at various international juridical conferences.
60 Both had a broad European network during this period. Karl Schlyter was a lawyer and politician (Social Democrat). He was raised as a child in Lutheran pietism but was influenced by scientists such as Charles Darwin, Ernst Häckel and the philosopher Harald Höffding. He left his childhood faith when attending secondary school and as an adult he can be described as an agnostic.
61
He was a minister without portfolio 1921 -1923 and 1925 -1926 , Minister of Justice 1932 -1936 , Member of Parliament 1919 -1920 and 1926 62 In other words, Schlyter was responsible for both the Procedural and Penal codes of Sweden, which are still in force.
During the earlier part of his life Schlyter was something of a Germanophile, with most Swedish lawyers looking to Germany for scholarly and law reform ideas during the latter part of the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries. Later in life Schlyter changed his opinion to favor partial reforms in procedure and penal legislation following the Anglo-Saxon pattern as opposed to the German model. 63 Other signs that Schlyter was a Germanophile is illustrated by his criticism of the Western powers that wanted to bring the German Kaiser to court for war crimes during the First World War. He stated that in England "they are certainly too intoxicated of the world spectacle that Kaiser Wilhelm is to be judged by a court composed of his enemies." 64 Schlyter's view of Germany changed later as a consequence of Hitler and Nazism. 65 He also appeared to be more positive to international tribunals and in 1943 argued that if Hitler was to be put before an international court where Schlyter was one of the judges, he would impose capital punishment (not because of vengeance but rather to protect society). 66 He even became reluctant to use the German language as a consequence of Nazi rule in Germany, later on deliberately using French 57 Lewandowski, Knutpunkt Stockholm, 152. 58 Levine. From Ibid., 59. when writing to German colleagues. 67 He also took a very clear stand against sterilization based on social considerations and racial hygiene. In 1921 Sweden had established the world's first racial biological institute "Statens institut för rasbiologi" with broad political support from left to right. In an article from 1929, Schlyter argued against sterilization regardless of whether it was for social or racial hygienic purposes. However, a law on sterilization was adopted in 1934 when Schlyter was Minister of Justice. 68 In the preparatory works he emphasized that public opinion displayed a consensus that this was an appropriate policy for the mentally retarded (in Swedish at the time called "sinnesslöa"). 69 While sterilization of the intellectually disabled today may be perceived as immoral, at that time and taking into account the historical context, it arguably cannot be seen as evidence that Schlyter was leaning towards fascism or Nazism. Schlyter was in the middle of the Swedish debate on refugees when the migration law was set to be prolonged in 1937. 70 Returning to Schlyter's international network, he successively established more and more international contacts with important persons abroad and he utilized these contacts in his work with his SLB committee. 71 As indicated above, Lemkin and Schlyter knew one another at the time Lemkin needed to get a visa to Sweden, a matter which Schlyter assisted with.
Another indicia that Schlyter opposed anti-Semitism was his choice of co-workers. One of Schlyter's close collaborators was the German born civil servant Dr. Gerhard Simson. As a Jew Simson fled to Sweden in 1939, where he obtained a position at the Ministry of Justice as a civil servant. 72 Following the proposal by Cuba, Panama and India for a resolution declaring genocide an international crime, in 1946 Lemkin wrote to Schlyter asking for his support for the initiative. In this correspondence Lemkin mentioned the Swedish female leader Hanna Rydh. 73 Schlyter was later instrumental in Sweden's signing of the Genocide Convention. On December 31, 1949, Lemkin wrote to Schlyter thanking him for his support and encouraging other Scandinavian countries to sign the convention. Lemkin also asked Schlyter to secure the ratification of Sweden and Denmark, and accession by Finland.
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Contacts with the Jewish Community Lemkin had a deep Jewish identity expressed in terms of how he described the world of the shtetl and the religious life of Jews. 75 He knew how to read Hebrew and he received religious education. 76 Cooper argues that Lemkin broadly sympathized with Zionist aspirations. 77 However, contrary evidence suggests that Lemkin was rather a Bundist and influenced by Karl Renner, the non-Jewish Austro-Marxist. Lemkin appears to have believed in multiethnic states with minority protection 72 rather than monocultural states based on a specific territory.
78 Moreover, there are indications that Lemkin practiced religion as an adult. Regardless, it was his Jewish heritage that explained why he had to flee Poland and temporarily seek refuge in Sweden. Thus, it becomes interesting to determine whether he sought contact with the Jewish community in Sweden and how this relationship was characterized. This was a sensitive issue at the time when Lemkin was in Stockholm.
Several holocaust survivors have accused the Jewish community in Stockholm (Mosaiska församlingen) of not doing enough during and after the Second World War. Claims have been made that it was the fault of the community leaders that more Jews were not given protection in Sweden. 79 Levine also notes that prior to the Second World War, the local Jewish population remained largely silent in the Swedish debate on immigration policy for fear that a substantial increase in Jewish immigration would incite even more anti-Semitism than they already experienced. 80 However, this has been challenged by Hansson and Rudberg. Hansson's conclusion is that the allegation that the Jewish community of Stockholm had been more restrictive than the Swedish Government is incorrect, although there were community officials like Rabbi Ehrenpreis who were more inclined to take part in sending relief to Jews abroad rather than to help refugees come to Sweden. 81 Rudberg has studied Swedish Jews' responses to the Nazi's anti-Jewish measures and found that the aid activities of the Jewish community of Stockholm, which came to represent Swedish Jewry, had a broader and more inclusive base than was previously known. Furthermore, Jewish representatives in Sweden tried to influence the Swedish and United States governments to change their immigration policies and admit more Jewish refugees. Rudberg's conclusion is that the form and limited extent of aid during different phases of the 1930s and the Second World War are ultimately attributable more to rigid governmental refugee policies, inadequate financial resources and international pressure than to the lack of effort or will on the part of Swedish Jews.
82
Statistics for the period from October 1940 show that the Jewish Community of Stockholm gave continuous monetary assistance to 185 persons over the age of 20. This covered only a small number of the refugees that at the time were in Sweden. The recipients were mainly from the middle class. A full monthly allowance was 100 kronor for a single household, for married couples 160 kronor and for couples with children there was an additional allowance of 20 kronor per child. 83 The assistance was financed by a tax applied on the members of the Jewish Community of Stockholm (3% on top of general Swedish taxes), state subsidies (30 % of the total funding for [1941] [1942] [1943] [1944] , support from the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and other foreign organizations.
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In the autumn of 1940, financial aid was given to 1,500 refugees, while at the time there were 4,000 refugees in the country. The aid was geared towards refugees in transit to other countries, which was the policy of the Jewish Community of Stockholm as well as the state. 85 As indicated above, the archives confirm that Lemkin received 100 kronor per month from the Jewish community of Stockholm. 86 
Lecturing at Stockholm University College and Friendship with Gösta Eberstein
As indicated above, prejudice against Jews was widespread within Sweden's intellectual and academic circles. Anti-Semitic feelings at the universities were made evident by widely publicized demonstrations in early 1939 at the three major Swedish universities: Uppsala University, Lund University and Stockholm University. Nazis in Stockholm managed to assemble students in meetings where slogans such as "protest against the Jew import" were displayed. The Student Union in Uppsala held meetings, most notably on February 17, 1939, where by a fraction gained the majority for a resolution denying 10 Jewish medical doctors entry into Sweden with the argument that it would risk the Swedish students' future possibilities of getting employment (548 voted in favor of the resolution and 349 against). The students in Lund based their arguments on the Uppsala decision and stated that they wanted to work for all Jews to leave Europe.
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There is nothing in the archives of the State Commission on Foreigners on Lemkin's employment. He had no work permit as at the time it was difficult for foreigners to gain a work permit, especially in the scholarly field. However, if one had connections with an employer which offered work it was easier to obtain such a permit.
90 It should be noted that at the time there was a shortage of competent persons (i.e. with the research degrees juris licentiat or juris doktor) eligible to become law professors.
91 However, such positions were arguably impossible to obtain for a Jewish scholar with a temporary residence permit. Szawłowski reaches a similar conclusion, namely, that the kind of career that Lemkin later made in the United States in the 1940s would have been impossible in Sweden. 92 Lemkin studied the Swedish language, Swedish law and worked on publishing an edition of his books in Swedish. He was able to lecture in Swedish after just five months, something that he described as making him "rise spiritually from the 'refugee' fall of modern man".
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Lemkin's book on international payments La réglementation des paiements internationaux (1939) was reported and reviewed by Professor Håkan Nial (civil law and conflicts of law at Stockholm University College) in the Swedish law journal Svensk Juristtidning. Nial placed the book in the context of stricter exchange controls with the outbreak of the Second World War. Nial praised the book, mentioned Lemkin's Polish origin, ends the review by describing the "tragic fall of [Lemkin's] motherland" and expressed hope that the author could contribute to the reconstruction of Europe. 94 The review of Nial appears important for Lemkin's future stay in Sweden. Cooper notes that "Lemkin's academic credentials were strengthened by the publication of the important In the same documents Lemkin is variously described as of polish nationality and "statslös" (stateless). 87 The author has hecked the correspondence of chief rabbi Ehrenpreis, rabbi Kronheim, Jewish Community of Stockholm and its relief committee, list of members of the Jewish community in Stockholm, all at Riksarkivet (Swedish National Archives). 88 Religionsfrihetslag (1951:680) 96 Under Schlyter, the journal had an explicit policy of not being dependent on contributors submitting texts, but rather the editors sought and asked distinct persons to contribute. Reviewing Schlyter's time as the editor, Sundell concludes that Schlyter often used the journal to disseminate information about areas, which were of importance to him. The selections of contributors and themes were made accordingly in order to influence opinion in the legal community. Sundell has in the archives of Svensk Juristtidning found several examples where Schlyter's selection of reviewers was made to influence the reception of a certain book. 97 Against this background, one may ask whether Schlyter's decision to publish a review of Lemkin's book was a political stand at a time when NaziGermany was occupying Poland.
Lemkin mentions Nial's review in his autobiography in the same sentence as he describes how Schlyter suggests that Lemkin should lecture on the topic of his book at Stockholm University College. As a result Lemkin went to see the Prorector (vice president) of the university, Gösta Eberstein (who was a law professor in private law and finance law, his main legacy in intellectual property law). They had a meeting of minds, and an invitation was extended. Eberstein asked " [i] n what language will you lecture?" to which Lemkin responded "[i] n what language would you want me to lecture? I know little Swedish -I study it every day." Lemkin tried his Swedish on Eberstein but the latter was not satisfied with his pronunciation. Friends telephoned a former actress, who agreed to work with Lemkin on his diction several hours a week.
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The course was on international payments, foreign exchange and banking laws. Lemkin started preparing his lectures drawing extensively on his book La réglementation des paiements internationaux, from which excerpts were translated into Swedish. Thus, the book became a bridge to the future just as he had intended. Whenever a lecture was ready, Lemkin would read it aloud with his teacher. After five months in Sweden he could address an audience in Swedish. His first lecture was attended by three hundred persons, many of them members of faculty as well as Prorector Eberstein. 99 The series had the title "International Payments: problems in international finance-and private law" (De internationella betalningarna: problem inom den internationella finans-och privaträtten) and the lectures were held on October 28, 1940 (Valuta-och clearingrättens allmänna drag, dess uppkomst och utveckling), October 31, 1940 (Valutarätt), November 4, 1940 (Clearingbestämmelser och betalningsöverenskommelser), 7 and November 7 and 11, 1940 (Valutarättsliga problem inom den internationella privaträtten) and November 14, 1940 (Clearingens privaträttsliga verkningar). Lemkin had the title Assistant Lecturer (assisterande föreläsare). 100 Lemkin sent a letter to Eberstein after the first lecture on October 28, 1940 where he wrote "Yesterday, after the hardest and darkest year of my life, I have experienced a joyful and spirited evening. This could only happen due to your kindness and so deeply distinct typically Swedish human kindness." 101 However, Lemkin's lectures during the autumn of 1940 were not included in the archives with course lists and registered students.
102 Furthermore, there are no documents indicating that the course was subject to written 105 Berglund expressed interest for Lemkin's work. Rector Hadar Berglund explained in a letter that their Professor Ivar Sundbom had an interest in the same field but considering that his lectures would be printed in a book they would not send a representative to attend the lectures in Stockholm. However, they expressed their interest to invite Lemkin to hold one or two lectures. 106 Lemkin and Eberstein became friends and Lemkin was invited on at least two occasions to the latter's home for dinner, the first recorded in a letter dated April 4, 1940.
107 When he was about to leave Sweden, the table was decorated with small red-and-white Polish flags. 108 In a letter after the dinner Lemkin wrote (in Swedish) that Eberstein's friendship strengthened him morally. 109 A few days after his arrival in the United States Lemkin wrote a dense six-page letter (in Swedish) to Eberstein from Duke University. The trip had been hard with the train taking 9 days through Siberia, but it had been worth it. Although he knew some Russian, he chose to speak in French and German since the Russian officials did not understand these languages that well. He found Moscow intense, filled with culture and music but also a lot of poverty. He did some sightseeing in Japan, including a visit to Kyoto. In addition, he was very well received at Duke University. At the time he did not know if his book was printed yet. He asked Eberstein to contact the publisher Norstedts and to send a copy. He also asked Eberstein to write to and ask Professor Gunnar Myrdal whether the latter could write a review of Lemkin's book in the American journals on economics.
110 At the time Myrdal, who was later to become the recipient of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1974, was in the United States. Eberstein did as Lemkin asked. Myrdal wrote in a letter to Eberstein that he had not yet received Lemkin's book. Myrdal would certainly take a look at it but was not sure whether he would be able to take the time to review it. 111 Lemkin wrote a second letter (in Swedish) to Gösta Eberstein explaining how valuable their friendship was and which had helped him survive the tough times. He had received a copy of his book Valutareglering och clearing (Exchange Control and Clearing). He had received several letters from persons in Sweden who had appreciated the book. Lemkin wrote how his English was gradually improving and that his lectures were going well. It appears as though Lemkin was considering to translate his book-which was already published in French and Swedish as 76 explained above -to English taking into account legislation in South America. There is no mention or indication in the letter that he was working on what later became Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. 112 From other sources we know that in the summer of 1942, Lemkin was in contact with the Carnegie Foundation regarding the translation of the book from Swedish or French. He approached several expert translators to have the book translated to English from the Swedish version but did not succeed in finding one that would meet the Foundation's requirements.
113 It thus appears as Lemkin's initial plan was to become established in the United States in the same manner as before he came to Sweden, i.e. by asking somebody to review his book -available both in French and Swedish -on exchange control and clearing and later translate it to English. Eberstein was in the thoughts of Lemkin for the coming years, with Lemkin, for example, sending him happy birthday greetings in 1942 and 1944. 114 Lemkin wrote in a first letter from 1943 that he was on leave from Duke University and serving as "head consultant with a certain office in Washington." From other subsequent sources, we know that it was the Board of Economic Warfare, which had the role of coordinating America's war effort following the attack on Pearl Harbor and America's entry into war. He also mentioned the difficult situation of his parents, brother, sister and nephew and asked whether the Swedish Foreign Office could do something for them.
115 In a second letter from 1943, Lemkin described how satisfied he was with the success of his book Valutareglering och clearing and that he hoped that his forthcoming book that he was working on at the time, would have the same success.
116 In a letter from 1945, Lemkin expressed interest in Eberstein's pamphlet on "The Right of Artists," 117 which may be explained by Lemkin's view that the destruction of culture could amount to genocide. In a letter from 1947 to Eberstein, Lemkin expressed sorrow that their correspondence had not continued as was intended but that their friendship was unaffected. He also mentioned that he had met Gunnar Myrdal in Lake Success and described how Myrdal had had great success in the United States with his book "An American dilemma: the Negro problem and modern Democracy," 118 a study commissioned by the Carnegie Corporation. Myrdal was commissioned because he was not American, Sweden had no background or tradition of imperialism and it was perceived that Myrdal could give a more unbiased opinion. 119 The book was a study of race relations in the United States and was described as a "modern authority" in the landmark Brown v. Board of Education case.
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Gösta Eberstein was committed to Nordic cooperation, he was an active member of the Swedish church, he was anti-Nazi and he had helped several Jewish refugees during the war. 121 During the war, together with Myrdal, Eberstein had actively supported the Freie Deutsche Kulturbund, the most prominent German association in exile. 122 In a discussion organized by student associations at Stockholm University College, Gösta Eberstein stated -in the context of the Second World War -that if what is just is not only made known but also internalized as a value it could stop violence, i.e. the war. The speech was made in May 1942 and he made several references to the ongoing war between Finland and the Soviet Union. 123 Eberstein's activism had the consequence that Swedish Nazis put him on the list of "traitors." 124 Ebersteins commitment against Nazism is further evidenced by the medal that the Danish King award him in 1946 for his action during the years of the Nazi occupation of Denmark. 125 Herbert Tingsten, professor in political science at Stockholm University College between 1936 and 1946, initially a socialist but later a liberal who was fervently pro-West and an early opponent of Nazism, in his memoirs described Eberstein as a person who "personifies kindness, right-mindedness and honesty."
126 Riksmarskalk (marshal of the realm, permanent secretary of the King), during the war president of Svea Appeals Court and professor Birger Ekeberg wrote that during the war, Eberstein was a passionate defender of rightmindedness, which his Danish and Norwegian friends could testify to. 127 Karl Schlyter was on the tabula gratulatoria in the liber amicorum dedicated to Gösta Eberstein which indicates that they were acquainted with each other. 128 There is some correspondence between them, the letters relating to possible contributions for Gösta Eberstein in Svensk Juristtidning while no correspondence is found between Eberstein and Schlyter which relates to Lemkin.
Lemkin published the book Valutareglering och clearing (Exchange Control and Clearing) which is an edited text of his lectures at Stockholm University College during the autumn of 1940. 129 The book was dedicated to Gösta Eberstein. The archives reveal that Gösta Eberstein was involved 78 in printing the book by acting as an intermediary between financiers and Lemkin. The printing of the book was financed by the General Export Association of Sweden (Sveriges Allmänna Exportföreningen), which donated 2,000 kronor for 900 copies and the Swedish Bankers' Association (Svenska Bankföreningen), which donated 600 kronor for 100 copies, the total circulation being 1,500 copies. The Bankers' Association was the first to pledge financial support. Häradshövding (judge) Dahlberg of the Bankers' Association explained that his son had attended Lemkin's lectures and found them easy to understand. However, a significant shortfall was the absence of any references to Swedish circumstances. Dahlberg forwarded his son's suggestion that referencing Swedish circumstances would be beneficial. 130 Eberstein wrote a letter to Lemkin (in Swedish) where he told him about the financial support from the Bankers' Association and asked him to consider the proposal to include references to Swedish circumstances. 131 Eberstein also wrote a letter to the General Export Association of Sweden where he informed them of the support from the Bankers' Association, the quality of Lemkin's lectures (based on the testimony of Dahlberg's son) and asked them for their support, which proved to be successful. 132 Lemkin completed the corrections on March 16, 1941, and submitted the manuscript to the printer (Norstedts) the following day. 133 The contract on the final circulation was 1,500 copies. 134 Lemkin wrote that this "linguistic victory means a great deal." It gave him intellectual selfassurance and it helped him to rise spiritually from the "refugee" fall of modern man. 135 It appears as if Lemkin's period as a lecturer at Stockholm University College and his book in Swedish left a lasting impression. Lars Hjerner -for a long time the Swedish authority on finance -has in the bibliography of the book Främmande Valutalag och Internationell Privaträtt included both of Lemkin's books on foreign exchange and banking laws. Lemkin's name appears already on page three of Hjerner's book, which could be a sign of influence. 136 Lemkin's analysis and conclusions on foreign exchange and banking laws are also noted in more recent research by Michael Hellner, 137 professor at Stockholm University.
When Lemkin arrived in Sweden he had approximately 150 kronor and he received 100 kronor per month from the Jewish community of Stockholm. Prior to the war he had deposited money in a bank in England, whereof he had successfully withdrawn 1,800 kronor, which he needed for his approaching journey to the United States. 138 The relief committee of the Jewish Community of Stockholm was a small voluntary organization that was dependent on the state's policies and decision-making.
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Stockholm as an Information Junction for Polish Resistance and Evidence of the Holocaust
As a result of a combination of its geopolitical location and successful realpolitik, Sweden managed to maintain its official policy of neutrality and stay out of Second World War. One of the consequences was that Sweden functioned as a channel for the information between the resistance 79 in Poland and the Government of the Republic of Poland in exile in London. 140 This channel was used while Lemkin was in Stockholm and contained information that was highly relevant to the work he was collecting material on -did Lemkin have access to the information directly or did he rely upon intermediate channels?
The channel through Sweden increased in importance after the Soviet Union occupied the Baltic states in June 1940, closing the Baltic route of information. An alternative route of information through Budapest was closed when Germany, Hungary and Romania attacked the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941. The Swedish businessmen who remained in Warsaw and continued to do business in Poland after the invasion by Nazi Germany were key to the information route through Stockholm. One of them was Sven Norrman, manager in Poland of the subsidiary to the Swedish Industry company ASEA. Others were Carl Herslow (Svenska Tändsticks AB -STAB also referred to as Zündholzmonopol AG), Sigfrid Häggberg (L M Ericsson) and Harald Axell (Polish-American Bank, in Polish: Bank Polsko-Amerykanski S.A. BP-A, owned by the Wallenberg family). During 1940 Swedish businessmen in Warsaw, including Norrman, started to act as couriers via Stockholm between the Polish resistance and the Polish Government in exile in London. 141 It was described as the most important information channel for the Polish resistance. At the end of 1940 the international communications of the Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa) was primarily carried out by Swedes. 142 The Swedish couriers did not only bring documents for the Polish organized resistance and intelligence, they also brought letters and messages for others, including private persons. 143 Levine argues that although Holocaust historians have noted the role by Sweden as a conduit for information about the Final Solution (i.e. the Nazi plan for the extermination of the Jews during the Second World War), they have, apart from Steven Koblick, seriously underestimated its significance just how much information was made available via Sweden between 1939 and 1942. 144 Norrman visited the Warsaw ghetto to witness the situation personally and on May 21, 1942, brought the first large report about the Holocaust, which revealed that Hitler had already murdered 700,000 Jews and had started to use gas to murder Jews. The material reached London at the latest by May 29, 1942 , and the story was first broadcasted by the BBC on June 2, 1942. One week later, on June 9, 1942, General Sikorski for the first time mentioned the mass murder of Poland's Jews. At the same time, the Daily Telegraph published an article with the text "GERMANS MURDER 700,000 JEWS IN POLAND" and the headline "TRAVELLING GAS CHAMBERS." 145 The Nazi leaders perceived the media coverage as very dangerous, Himmler writing to von Ribbentrop about the Swedish businessmen in Warsaw: [W] ithin the framework of the entire enemy intelligence operations directed against Germany, the intelligence of the Polish resistance movement assumed major significance… One of the most important lines ran via Stockholm… Subsequent discoveries led to the conclusion that a number of Swedish nationals domiciled in Warsaw, employees of the Warsaw branches of the Swedish companies, ASEA, Ericsson and STAB who frequently visited Sweden for business or personal reasons, should be considered likely intelligence couriers… the most important couriers' route between the Polish resistance movement in the General-Government and the Polish Government-in-exile in London. Norrman is identified by Himmler as the central figure of the Swedish-Polish intelligence.
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The Swedish businessmen acted without approval of their companies or the Swedish Government. The state policy at the time was the opposite, for example, on April 23, 1941, the State Council on Media (statliga Pressnämnden) gave new directives to Swedish media to avoid "detailed descriptions of atrocities connected to the war." 147 It is noted that the Swedish state at a later stage changed its policy and abandoned its neutrality, this, according to Levine, coinciding with the implementation by the Nazis of a racial ideology. The shift from indifference to activism by the Swedish state began in December 1942 as a response to the German transport on November 26, 1942, of 532 Jewish men, women and children on a ship from Norway to Stettin and then on to Auschwitz. Sweden consequently advised Germany that it was "prepared to accept all remaining Jews in Norway should they be subject to removal." 148 The Polish exiled Government compiled the reports that came from occupied Poland in a series called the Account for the situation in Poland (hereinafter referred to as the Account) and from the winter of 1941 only 100 copies were disseminated to a selected group of prominent persons in a secret fashion. The exiled Polish Government in London used the material in the Account to inform the world what is happening in Poland and gain support. Mieczysław Thugutt, contact person of the Polish civil resistance in Stockholm, has stated that all documents in the Account from the start of the occupation until the summer of 1942 were smuggled from Poland by Norrman. The reports in the Account were used for several books on the situation in Poland, one of them being The Black Book of Poland 149 which was translated to several languages, including a summary in a Swedish pamphlet. 150 The first Swedish edition was published in 1942 after Lemkin had left Sweden. The first text in the Account contains German occupation laws in Poland, 151 something of great interest to Lemkin. The Holocaust was not given priority and there is not much text on the matter in the first edition of the Account. It was treated at a secondary matter. On the other hand, Lewandowski argues that it is surprising that aggressive anti-Semitism was absent from first edition of the Account, considering the anti-Semitism that was present in various Polish groups at the time. In later editions one may find aggressive anti-Semitism. 152 Even though the documents transited through Stockholm at the time Lemkin was a resident, there is no information that Lemkin had direct access to or knowledge about the Account or the Swedish couriers. However, Lemkin lists The Black Book of Poland as one of the works cited in Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. The bulk of the text in Lemkin's book is a review of occupation laws and he explains in the section on Poland that the documents used could be found in The Black Book of Poland.
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Work on Axis Rule in Occupied Europe
Lemkin wrote that " [a] refugee is, first of all, a state of mind… He becomes like a broken pencil and cannot reunite the lost values of the past with the confused and hostile values of his present state of dispossession. The refugee status is the… fall of the modern man, sometimes the giving up of spiritual life and creation." 154 As noted above, Lemkin stated that the possibility of lecturing in Stockholm made him "rise spiritually from the 'refugee' fall of modern man."
155
While lecturing at the University College of Stockholm Lemkin collected material for Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: legal decrees the Nazis had issued in each of the countries they occupied. The major part of the book consisted of sources similar to those that Lemkin collected in Stockholm and brought with him to the United States. He relied upon the network that he once managed from Warsaw -including a Swedish corporation with offices in Warsaw for which he had sometimes acted as a lawyer and branches in occupied countries, Swedish embassies around Europe and the Red Cross delegations and German occupation radio -to gather official gazettes in the occupied countries. He also found official gazettes of the German Reich in library collections in Stockholm. He hoped to compile these laws to demonstrate the ways in which these laws propagated hate and incited murder. As a lawyer he placed great significance on official documents for understanding Nazi policy. He read the intentions of the Nazi Government from legal enactments such as decrees and ordinances. He perceived these decrees and ordinances as "objective and irrefutable evidence." Lemkin claims in his memoir that from the documents he could deduce that the Nazi's aimed for the "complete destruction" of the Jews. 156 Cooper argues that it is far from certain whether Lemkin collected all this information from the decrees before his departure from Sweden. Until the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, there had been some arbitrary killings of Jews but no major massacre. 157 Cooper cautions against the use of Lemkin's memoirs as a source, arguing that Lemkin antedates the evolution of his prescient perception of murderous plans either to October 1939, when he was fleeing Poland, or his stay in Sweden, when he started collecting Nazi occupation decrees. Lemkin was probably aware of the ghettos, but it was less likely that he knew of the policy of starvation and the genocidal intent of the Nazis. 158 Another consideration is whether Lemkin had additional sources? It is possible that Cooper does not consider the fact that Stockholm functioned as a channel of information. The city may have been one of the first points outside of Nazi occupied Europe where information about the Holocaust was spread both through documents but also verbally. Koblok writes that reports of Germany's continued and stepped-up persecution of the Jews reached Stockholm in 1941, since Swedish businessmen, reporters and diplomats were able to move about in occupied Eastern Europe. The postal service continued to function and censored private letters traveled between Sweden and Poland. Although the censorship exercised by Germany eliminated specific details, it did not hide the increasingly harsh fate that awaited Jews. 159 Sands notes that even after his arrival in the United States, Lemkin continued to receive documents from Stockholm. 160 The available material suggests that at the time when he was in Stockholm, Lemkin had early access to information on the situation in Poland. This was due to Swedish neutrality and Lemkin's network in Poland. The fact that in his autobiography Lemkin mentioned that Swedish businessmen in Warsaw -who he had worked for as a lawyer before the war -helped him to get documents from Poland and parallel accounts of how Swedish businessmen such as Norrman, Herslow and Häggberg brought key documents from Poland to Stockholm, raises the question of just exactly who it was that helped Lemkin. One may ask why Lemkin did not identify by name the Swedish businessmen who helped him. It is also difficult to access any details on Lemkin's private practice as a commercial lawyer before the war. 161 Even though Norrman, Herslow and Häggberg today may be perceived as heroes, this was not necessarily the perception in Sweden during as well as after the war. The Swedish businessmen concealed their assistance for the Polish resistance from 154 Lemkin, Totally Unofficial, [67] [68] 155 Ibid., 65; Power, A Problem from Hell, 26. 156 Lemkin, Totally Unofficial, [76] [77] 116 Lemkin, Totally Unofficial, XII; Sands, East West Street, 161. their superiors as they were afraid of being perceived as disloyal to their companies and country. To illustrate their silence, one may note that their work for the Polish resistance was unexplored by Swedish historians until 1976 when a Polish historian -Lewandowski -revealed the story.
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The question concerning when Lemkin got information about what was happening in Poland is important since some scholars contend that when Lemkin wrote Axis rule in Occupied Europe he "did not yet fully comprehend the total planned annihilation of the Jewish people in Europe." 163 As noted above, the Swedish couriers did not only bring documents for the Polish organized resistance and intelligence, they also brought letters and messages for others, including private persons.
164 If Lemkin was in contact with Norrman, Herslow and/or Häggberg he might have had up to date access to reliable information about the Holocaust. Obviously, he did not have information about the Nazi extermination camps at the time he was in Stockholm since the camps had not yet been established. Lemkin appears to date the first reports and official knowledge in West about the mass executions to late 1942.
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Conclusion
To summarize, while in Stockholm Lemkin collected material for Axis Rule in Occupied Europe which mainly consisted of legal decrees that the Nazis had issued in each of the countries they occupied. Even though it is unlikely that Lemkin received direct access to confidential documents and written reports that Norrman, Herslow and Häggberg smuggled from Poland on behalf of the Polish resistance, it is plausible that he got hold of verbal reports and accounts of the Holocaust that supplemented the decrees. This may in turn have provided him with the context necessary to understand the ongoing events.
As described in this study, Lemkin received valuable help from Karl Schlyter and Gösta Eberstein, who helped him to escape Nazi ruled Europe and re-establish himself as a scholar. It is also notable how other prominent Swedish scholars crossed paths with Lemkin, including Gunnar Myrdal and Bertil Ohlin, both recipients of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. This study is not only a story about Lemkin, but also about how Swedish academia interacted with a Jewish refugee during the Second World War.
There are some additional, potential leads that may shed light on the connection between Lemkin and the Swedish businessmen, which would require the additional collection of material and research. The author of this study has been given access to the archives of STAB (Swedish Match) and L M Ericsson to check whether their Polish subsidiaries and BP-A (owned by Stockholms Enskilda Bank) had hired Lemkin as a lawyer or had been in contact with him. However, no response has been received in relation to repeated requests to access the archives of ASEA (ABB). In addition, documentation in Poland about Lemkin's law firm could provide additional potential leads. Furthermore, this study has mainly examined archives in Sweden, which include correspondence sent by Lemkin to friends and colleagues, but not so much correspondence received by Lemkin. Potential depositaries of Lemkin's correspondence in the United States have been contacted, however this has only resulted in access to fragments of the correspondence Lemkin received.
